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【Summary】 
 
Unlike general goods, broadcasting service is financed not only by consumer’s direct 
payment but also by advertisement revenue. In other words, broadcasting service is 
supported by direct and indirect financial sources. However, rate of dependence on those 
financial sources are different by each media type; Terrestrial broadcasting carrier 
primarily depends on advertisement revenue while cable TV carrier and satellite carrier, 
which is called as pay-TV primarily depend on payment from audience in addition to 
small amount of advertisement revenue. 
 
In this paper, we examine broadcast market, where carriers with different financial 
sources compete in the market, and analyze market performance as a result of 
competition. Especially, we focus on the effect of competition in the mixed market which 
includes advertising supported media and subscription fee supported media.  
 
We made economic model and analyze the difference on several types of market. Our 
principle results of Case III, the market that an advertisement supported carrier and a 
subscription supported carrier compete in the market, are as follows;. 
 
 (1) The greater the substitutability is, the number of channels supplied by advertisement 
supported media increases while those supplied by subscription fee supported carrier 
decreases. 
(2) Total number of channels supplied by advertisement supported carrier and 
subscription fee supported carrier is equal to the number of channels supplied by an 
advertisement supported carrier (Case II). 
(3) Total TV watching time of Case III is equal to Case II. 
(4) Because the amount of payment by consumer increases compared to Case II, consumer 
surplus decreases. 
 
General economic model predicts that the increase of the number of entrants brings the 
increase of consumer surplus. However, in our model, we show here that the increase of 
the number of entrants does not necessarily bring the increase of consumer surplus. 
 
 
Keywords:  broadcast service, market performance, consumer welfare, advertisement 
supported /subscription fee supported media. 
 
(JEL Classifications: D40, D60, L50, L82) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Unlike general goods, broadcasting service is financed not only by consumer’s direct 
payment but also by advertisement revenue. In other words, broadcasting service is 
supported by direct and indirect financial sources. However, rate of dependence on those 
financial sources are different by each media type; Terrestrial broadcasting carrier 
primarily depends on advertisement revenue while cable TV carrier and satellite carrier, 
which is called as pay-TV primarily depend on payment from audience in addition to 
small amount of advertisement revenue. 
 
In this paper, we examine broadcast market, where carriers with different financial 
sources compete in the market, and analyze market performance as a result of 
competition. Especially, we focus on the effect of competition in the mixed market which 
includes advertising supported media and subscription fee supported media1. There are 
some previous researches from the similar viewpoint that focus on the relationship 
between different financial sources and service quality (or program substitutability / 
complementarity) (e.g. Spence and Owen (1977), Armstrong (2004) and Choi (2006)). 
However, we analyze the impact of different financial sources on economic welfare based 
on theoretical model here. As far as we know, this topic has rarely been treated in 
previous researches. General economic model predicts that the increase of the number of 
entrants brings the increase of consumer surplus. However, in our model, we show here 
that the increase of the number of entrants does not necessarily bring the increase of 
consumer surplus. 
 
 
2. Utility Function and Demand Function 
 
When we evaluate the consumer surplus of broadcasting service, (1) the number of 
channels and (2) watching time are considered to be quite important components. Here, 
we assume that consumer decide the number of available channels, 1,2, , N"  and 
watching time of each channels, 1 2, , Nx x x" , and maximize his utility based on 
combination of these two factors. Further, we consider that consumer can watch channels 
which is closer to his preference (in other words, lineup or alternative increases) as the 
number of channels, N , increases, and assume the following utility function2. 
 
                         
1 In this paper, we treat that “pay-TV carrier” and “subscription fee supported media (carrier)” have the same 
meaning for simplicity, although pay-TV carrier depends on both advertisement revenue and subscription fee 
practically. 
2 Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) used this utility function in order to express the relationship between consumer 
utility and product variety. 
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z  shows other leisure time and ρ  is within the range of 0 1ρ< < . If we assume 
1 2 Nx x x x= = = =" , then ix Nx X= =∑  and 1U N Xρρ−=  are derived. We find consumer 
utility is expressed as the function of the number of available channels, total watching 
time and total leisure time3. 
 
If each consumer decides watching time X and the number of available channels N  
under two constraints (time constraint and budget constraint). The utility maximization 
problem is formulated as follows.  
 
Max  U AN Xα β=    
 X L T+ =     (time constraint) 
1 3p X p N w L′ ′+ × = ×  (budget constraint) 
 
Note that two constraints can be transformed as follows; 
 
( )1 31T p X p N= + +  (Full-Income constraint), 1 1 /p p w′= 、 3 3 /p p w′=  
Resolving above maximization problem, we obtain two independent demand functions on 
watching time and the number of channels, 
12 1
TX
p
β
α= + , 31
TN
p
β
α
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
 
3. Model Specification 
 
In our model, we assume one carrier can offer only one channel for simplicity. In this case, 
the number of available channels is equal to the number of operating carrier in the 
market. In addition, we assume two linear demand functions: One is demand function on 
                         
3 Speaking of (1 ) /δ ρ ρ= − , if we assume 0 1δ< <  (marginal utility is positive and diminishing), 
0.5 1ρ< <  are derived.  
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watching time, 1X pα β= − , and the other is demand function on channels, 3N pδ γ= − . 
Note that 1p , 2p , 3p  show usage fee, advertisement price and price for purchasing 
channel respectively. Under this setting, let’s consider competitive situation and welfare 
change in each market, with respect to the following three cases.  
 
 
Case I: The market that an advertisement supported carrier supply one channel 
as a monopolist.  
 
A profit function of advertisement supported carrier is shown as follows, assuming that 
marginal cost per watching time is constant. 
 
( ) ( ){ }1 2(1/ )AN p p X c Xπ = + −  
Note that AN  shows the number of advertisement supported carrier.  
 
Broadcasting carrier decides price 1p  in order to maximize above profit function. Social 
welfare is defined as sum of consumer utility and firm profit. Profit increase of 
advertisement placement firm and utility decrease of audience caused by the existence of 
advertisement are ignored 4 . If broadcasting carrier is monopoly, 1AN =  and profit 
function is expressed as ( ) ( )1 1 2p p X c Xπ = + − . Following the first-order condition, we 
obtain the relationship that the equilibrium price, *1p , depends on the level of 
advertisement price, 2p . When advertisement price exceeds a certain value, 
*
1p  is equal 
to zero and watching time is maximized at *x α= .  In short,  
 
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β≥ + ,  
                                                     
*
1 0p = , *X α= , 
                                                  *1 2 0xp c cπ α α= − −  
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β< + ,  
*
1 2
1
2 x
p c pαβ
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  ( ){ }* 2
1
2 x
X p cα β= + − ,  
                         
4  These two effects are not so clear, and we have to use general equilibrium analysis in order to evaluate 
social welfare. Therefore, in this paper, we assume these two effects are zero. However, the loss caused by this 
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( ) 2* 2 21 2 2 01 2 2 44 x x xp c p c c c
απ β α β α ββ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= + − + − − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭  
 
To sum up an analysis of case I, we can show the following three result.  
 
(1) Optimal price level depends on the level of advertisement price. When advertisement 
price exceeds a certain value, broadcasting service fee for consumer is equal to zero and 
watching time is maximized. This result is consistent to current business model.  
(2) Producer’s surplus increases up to infinity as advertisement price, 2p , increases.  
(3) However, consumer’s surplus is not maximized because the number of supplied 
channels is fixed as 1 ( 1N = ).  
 
 
Case II: The market that multiple advertisement supported carriers exist and 
compete in the market.  
 
In case I, an advertisement supported carrier model, the number of supplier and the 
number of channels are set by 1. Here, in case II, we develop the model on free entry 
market and analyze the number of entrant (= channels) at equilibrium level.            
 
In the case of free entry, we assume that audience watch each channels at the same rate. 
Therefore watching time of each channels is (1/ )x N X= . Further, we assume 
symmetrical property on demand and cost structure of each carrier5. Then, demand 
function and profit function of each carrier are ( )1(1/ )x N pα β= − , ( )1 2p x p x C xπ = + − , 
respectively. Note that boundary condition of price strategy is independent from the 
number of carriers, AN 6. The optimal price strategy of broadcasting carriers is the same 
                                                                            
simplification seems not to be so large.  
5 We ignore the interdependent relationship of price strategy that each carrier takes.  
6 The reason why boundary condition is independent from the number of carriers are caused by our 
assumption that some functions are expressed as linear form;  
(1) We assume marginal cost is constant to scale (boundary condition should be the function of the number 
of entrants if we assume marginal cost increases to scale). 
(2) We assume advertisement price is constant (boundary condition is not independent if advertisement 
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as monopoly (case I). Therefore, price, output and the number of entrant at the 
equilibrium, *AN , are derived as follows;               
 
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β≥ + ,  
                                                     
*
1 0p = , *
1
A
x
N
α= , 
                                                  [ ]*1 2 01 x
A
p c c
N
π α α= − − , 
* 2
0
x
A
p cN
c
α α−=  
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β< + ,  
                          *1 2
1
2 x
p c pαβ
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , ( ){ }* 2
1 1
2 xA
x p c
N
α β⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
                       ( ) ( )2 2* 21 2 2 01 1 1 124 2 4x x xA c c c p p cN
απ α β α β ββ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
( ) ( )2 22 2 2
*
0
1 1 12
4 2 4x x x
A
c c c p p
N
c
α α β α β ββ
⎛ ⎞− − + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  
 
These results imply that once advertisement price is determined, one of two financial 
strategies is adopted by broadcasting carriers; (a) the strategy based on advertisement 
revenue only, or (b) the strategy based on mixed financial sources of advertisement 
revenue and consumer payment. On the other hand, output level of each carriers, *x , 
should be 1/ AN . Speaking of equilibrium entrant level, 
*
AN , broadcasting carriers enter 
the market until profit decreases to zero. Total watching time is calculated as product of 
the number of channels and watching time of each carrier, AN x . In short, Total watching 
time is the same as monopoly (case I). On the other hand, consumer’s surplus increases 
because the number of channels is the same as the number of entrants, AN .                                         
 
                                                                            
price changes to the scale). 
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Case III: The market that an advertisement supported carrier and a subscription 
fee supported carrier compete in the market.  
 
Based on case I and case II, here in case III, we examine the effect of market entry by                             
subscription fee supported carrier. Suppose that firm 1 and firm2 indicate advertisement 
supported carrier and subscription fee supported carrier respectively. With respect to 
advertisement supported carrier model, the number of channels is determined based on 
advertisement price and cost structure. If consumer’s marginal utility is positive under 
this equilibrium channel number, consumer’s surplus increases by adding channels. 
Because demand function of channels is 3N pδ γ= − , demand for pay-TV service (= 
subscription fee supported carrier) is shown as P AN N N= − , assuming the number of 
channels offered by advertisement supported carrier is AN .   
 
Note that channels are assumed to be differentiated to some extent between 
advertisement supported carrier and subscription fee supported carrier, and demand 
function of pay-TV service is supposed to be 3P AN N pδ φ γ= − − . φ  is a parameter which 
indicates the degree of substitutability and means perfect substitute if 1φ = . The 
condition which broadcasting service is provided is 0ANδ φ− > . Cost function and profit 
function of pay-TV carrier are denoted as 2 0 n pC c c N= + , 2 3 2Pp N Cπ = × −  respectively. 
Pay-TV market is supposed to be competitive, and equilibrium is achieved at the level 
that price for broadcasting service is equal to marginal cost. The equilibrium price and 
the number of channels are determined as 3 Np c= , P A NN N cδ φ γ= − − .           
 
The model setting with respect to advertisement supported carrier is the same as case I 
and case II, but watching time (=demand function) depends on total number of channels, 
which means 1 (1/ )x N X= , A PN N N= + .  Because cost function, profit function and the 
number of entrant at the equilibrium, *AN , are the same as previous case, the result is 
shown as follows;               
 
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β≥ + ,  
                                                     
*
1 0p = , * 1x N α= , 
                                                  [ ]*1 2 01 xp c cNπ α α= − − , 
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* * * *2
0
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p cN N N N
c
α α−= − = −  
In the case of 2 ( / ) xp cα β< + ,  
   
*
1 2
1
2 x
p c pαβ
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,   ( ){ }* 2
1 1
2 x
x p c
N
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 ( ) ( )2 2* 21 2 2 01 1 1 124 2 4x x xc c c p p cN
απ α β α β ββ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
 
( ) ( )2 22 2 2
* *
0
1 1 12
4 2 4x x x
A P
c c c p p
N N
c
α α β α β ββ
⎛ ⎞− − + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −  
 
At the equilibrium, the number of channels offered by advertisement supported carrier 
depends on those supplied by pay-TV carrier. They are indicated 
( )* 1/(1 )A NN A cφ δ γ= − − + , ( )* /(1 )P N NN A c cδ φ φ δ γ γ= − − − + − , respectively.  Note that 
A  denotes the number of carriers (which is equal to the number of channels) when 
pay-TV service is not provided. As the same as before, A  depends on advertisement price, 
2p .  
 
The principle results of Case III are summarized as follows;  
(1) The greater φ  is, in other words, the greater the substitutability is, the number of 
channels supplied by advertisement supported media increases while those supplied by 
subscription fee supported carrier decreases. 
(2) Total number of channels supplied by advertisement supported carrier and 
subscription fee supported carrier, * *A PN N+ , is equal to the number of channels 
supplied by an advertisement supported carrier (Case II). 
(3) Total TV watching time of Case III is equal to Case II. 
(4) Because the amount of payment by consumer increases compared to Case II, 
consumer’s surplus decreases. 
 
Because the entry of pay-TV carrier doesn’t change total TV watching time and total 
number of available channels, but increases only user payment, it decreases consumer’s 
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surplus. This result is caused by the assumption that the number increase of offered 
channels decreases TV watching time per each carrier. In other words, because 
advertisement supported carrier and pay-TV carrier compete with respect to TV watching 
time in the market, if the number of channels is increased by pay-TV carrier, watching 
time for advertisement supported carrier decreases and the number of channels offered 
by advertisement supported carrier also decreases.       
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine broadcasting market, where carriers with different financial 
sources compete, assuming two independent demand functions with respect to watching 
time and channels. Note that our theoretical model depends on many assumptions. To 
construct more realistic model is our future task. For example, we should incorporate 
interdependent relationship on demand between watching time and channels, or should 
consider interdependent relationship on strategy between advertisement supported 
carrier and subscription fee supported carrier, or should consider carrier who depends on 
both financial sources.  
 
However, our contribution in this paper is to formulate the broadcasting market 
competition by carriers with different financial sources, considering two major factors of 
broadcasting demand, such as watching time and channels. We hope our paper provide 
the basic framework for economic analysis on broadcasting market.  
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